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At present ships are monitored for fire, flooding,
and other casualties by watches such as the Sounding
and Security Watch, but casualties still cause
millions cf dollars of damage each year. The need for
a damage control monitoring system is discussed in
detail and the design requirements for a system are
identified. A number of alternatives for a monitoring
system are examined, and one of these alternatives is
recommended f cr implementation and prototype testing.
The proposed system, which uses a network of fire and
flooding detectors in individual compartments
connected via a power line carrier to a central
processor, can be developed at exceptionally low risk
using existing technology and at a price that can be
afforded. The system would provide comprehensive
damage control monitoring, and could be adapted to
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A paper titled "A Damage Control Monitoring System,"
presented at EASCON-76, proposed that an inexpensive damage
control monitoring system be developed to provide naval
ships with a system designed to reduce the watch
reguirements and also reduce losses due to fires and
floodings £11]. This thesis is intended to amplify on that
proposal.
Sufficient information is provided in this thesis to
show that a damage control system is feasible and desirable,
that it can be developed with low risk using existing
technology, and that its development, manufacture,
installation and maintenance can be accomplished at a
considerable dollar savings to the Navy.
B. BACKGROUND
1 - Shipboard Casualties
To establish the severity of the fire and flooding
problem on naval ships, previous reports on the subject were
examined. Two reports, "Patrol Frigate Machinery Space Fire
Protection and Safety Hazards Study" and "Safety Analysis of

Lube Oil Systems" used the same data and produced similar
results [17,22]- These reports contain . a compilation of
data on 825 fires which occurred on naval ships from 1954 to
1972. The fire data in these reports were evaluated by
grouping the fires according to cause factor and cost.
Figure 1 , a summary taken from these reports, shews a
3-dimensional histogram where the height of a block is
proportional to the number of events in a particular cause
and cost category.
A third report used the narratives of fires,
explosions and floodings for a three year period from July
1969 through June 1973 [23]. From the narratives, the
compartment in which the casualty occurred and the cost of
the casualty was obtained. A hazard index for each
compartment was thea established by assigning a cost factor
and frequency factor as explained in Table I below.
Eg.: Hazard Index = Average Cost Factor + Freguency Factor
Accident Cost Frequency of Fr e^uency
Average Cost Factor Occurence Factor
0-100 1 1-10 1
101-500 2 11-20 2









500,001-1,000,000 9 81-90 9
1,000,001- 10 91-100 10
-
-
Table I. - COMPUTATION OF HAZARD INDEX
A number of tables were then prepared which listed
fire data, explosion data, flooding data and a combined
hazard ranking. The tables were further subdivided to put
ships into four groups; auxiliary ships, cruiser/destroyers,
carriers, and amphibious ships. As there was considerable
similarity across the four groups in the compartment names





























ranking was made from data in the report. The hazard
ranking for this list, Table II, was obtained by summing the
hazard ranking for each type of casualty (fire, explosion,






















































































































































































































































































Table II. - COMBINED HAZARD RANKING BY COMPARTMENT NAME
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Figure 1 serves to show the causes of fires and
Table II lists the most hazardous compartments but neither
answers the basic question of whether or not a damage
control monitoring system would have an impact on the
severity of the casualties. To answer this question
narrative reports pf all reported fires having damage
assesments in excess of $10,000 and floodings in excess of
$1,000, were obtained from the Naval Safety Center, Norfolk,
Virginia [16], The narratives were then put into three
groups; (1) casualties where a monitoring system would have
prevented losses, (2) casualties where a system might have
reduced the losses, and (3) casualties on which a monitoring
system would have had no effect.
The narratives in the first and second group
revealed that many of the fires have two things in common.
First, they begin slowly, sometimes smoldering for hours in
a closed compartment before being discovered. Second, when
discovered the smoke is so thick that fire fighters are
unable to locate the source of the fire for many minutes.
The nature of shipboard construction designed to prevent the
advance of fire and flooding effectively prevents the
discovery of the casualties as well.
Many of the costly fires, falling into group three,
were oil fires which began in engineering spaces as a result
of oil igniting when in contact with operating machinery.
No monitoring system, unless coupled with some, form of
automatic extinguishing system, will reduce the effects of
these fires. The purpose of those studies mentioned above
was to locate the causes and hazards so that such automatic
detection and extinguishing systems could be designed for
future ships. As it is unlikely that the future systems
designed will be back fitted to existing ships, there is a
program to isolate the sources of oil and to insulate all
13

machinery which operates above the ignition temperature of
the oil. This program has reduced somewhat the frequency of
oil fires.
Two attempts were made to correlate the results
determined from the 1973-1975 data with that from the
1954-1972 period. During the earlier period, 39% of the
total fires had damage in excess of $10,000, while it was
15% for the later period. The most probable reason for the
difference is in the method of gathering the data.
Prior to 1S70, the Naval Safety Center served
primarily as a repository for reports. In the early 70* s,
the Safety Center began to put its information on computer
files and to cull supply requisition records and other
sources for data on all types of casualties. As a result
the number of casualties recorded on the data files has
significantly increased. These increases have been
primarily the low cost casualties which were not previously
reported to the Safety Center for one reason or another.
Because of the likelihood that during both periods
the most costly fires had been reported, a second attempt
was made to correlate the percentage of fires in the $10,000
and above range with the percentage of total losses. It was
found that during the 1973-1975 period, 15% of the fires
produced 96% of the damage and during the 1954-1972 period,
13% of the fires produced 92% of the losses. It can be seen
then that analyzing additional reports on numerous small
fires (less than $10,000) would not impact the results. It
is therefore felt the results obtained from a small sample
of the most costly fires was a good indicator of the




Based on the narrative report analysis, the graph in
Figure 2 shows the percentage total losses due to both fire
and floodings which could have been saved had adequate
monitoring been available in the years 1973-1975. The lower
percentage (Group 1 casualties) represents the total losses
which a monitoring system would have prevented by alerting
personnel of the casualty. The higher percentage (Group 1
plus Group 2 casualties) represents losses which probably
would have been considerably reduced had a monitoring system
been available to reduce the time between the initiation of
a casualty and the steps taken to correct the casualty. On
the average over the three year period, 48% and 61%,
respectively, of the fire and flooding losses could have
been eliminated. An additional T3% and 9%. of the total
losses might have been reduced by a monitoring system.
2. Damage Control Monit oring
The traditional method of detection and monitoring
aboard naval ships is the sounding and security watch, the
below-decks watch, cold-iron watch or roving patrol. All
naval ships maintain one or more of these watches 24 hours a
day. The principal watch is the sounding and security
watch. The man on watch periodically makes rounds of
various spaces checking for fire and flooding, monitoring
material conditions, and providing security. The man is
also required to maintain an extensive record of equipment
status and operating parameters. As a result, the watch, in
the normal execution of his duties, may not visit portions
of the ship any oftener than every one to two hours. In
addition to its infrequency, this method of monitoring has a
number of other inherent drawbacks. For instance, the man
on watch does not have access to locked offices and
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YEAR
TOTAL VALUE REPRESENTED: $30,000,000
Figure 2 - SAVINGS USING DAMAGE CONTROL MONITORING
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detect toxic gases, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and
temperatures or pressures with any degree of accuracy. At
worst, an individual may be ineffective in his duties
through physical illness, exhaustion, boredom, inattention
to detail, lack of adequate training or any combination of
these.
The cost of repairs, lost training time, lost man
hours and the occasional loss of life due to casualties is
all out of proportion to the immediate damage suffered. Two
instances should suffice to illustrate this effect.
Aboard one ship a conscientious sounding and
security patrol attempted to pump a storeroom bilge. He lit
off the eductor, checked for proper operation and continued
his rounds. Shortly thereafter the eductor became clogged
and back flooded the storeroom. Upon returning, the
sounding and security patrol found the water to be 6-8 feet
deep. The eductor was secured, the storeroom dewatered and
the cause of the accident was discovered to be the clogged
eductor. The immediate effect on the ship and its mission
was minimal. However, the following was required to restore
the casualty:
An immediate inventory of the storeroom was
conducted. The storeroom contained electronic spares which
began to corrode upon reexposure to the air after the salt
water bath. The majority of the spare parts were discarded
as unusable or unreliable and replacements ordered. Two
weeks of continuous work was required for the inventory and
reordering, and six months later, not all of the parts had
been received. An electric motor and pump in the
compartment also were covered with water. The motor
required removal from the ship, cleaning, baking, testing
aboard a tender and return, all of which required three
weeks of routine work.
17

After drying of the insulation on the storeroom
bulkheads, a thorough cleaning to prevent further corrosion
was required and the storeroom repainted. An investigation
was conducted and a report generated requiring additional
manhours in questioning witnesses, and compiling the report.
Material damage reported to the Naval Safety Center— $0, no
operating equipment was destroyed, no lives wers lost, and
no outside contract was required to effect repairs.
Aboard the same ship some time later a fire started
in a closed pumproom apparently from a carelessly discarded
cigarette. The fire smoldered for some time, filling the
pumproom with dense black smoke. Again the sounding and
security watch discovered the fire. It was difficult to put
out because the pump room is inaccessible and it was
difficult to get equipment to the scene through the smoke
while wearing oxygen breathing apparatus. As it turned out
the fire had caused very little damage, only burning a few
rags and some gasket material that had caused the dense
smoke. Smoke damage in the vicinity of the fire was heavy
and required that personnels clothes and bedding be washed.
Bulkheads and overheads of nearby compartments also required
washing to remove sopt and smoky odors. An investigation
and report was also required here. The fire fighting water
used to extinguish the fire had gotten on the pumps in the
pumproom and required extensive cleanup before an attempt
was made to use them. Material damage reported to the Naval
Safety Center— $0.
The important fact about both these shipboard
casualties and many others is that, even with conscientious
sounding and security watches, they resulted in extensive
losses. If these two casualties had been detected earlier
it is likely that no damage would have resulted and the
report to the Naval Safety Center could have correctly
reflected the situation, two casualties, damage zero.
18

The need for continuous monitoring is well
established and watches are maintained aboard Navy ships
from before initial commissioning in a building yard until
final decommissioning many years later. Manpower cost
estimation for the sounding and security watch based on
"Navy Military Manpower Billet Cost for Life Cycle Planning
Purposes," NAVPERS 15163, is $13,600 per man-year. The
Sounding and Security Watch requires three men to man a 24
hour Condition III (Peace Time) watch. The cost per year
then is $40,800. The life cycle estimate of 20 years for a
ship would place the manpower cost of the sounding and
security watch at $816,000. This is a great deal of money
to spend to maintain a system which has proven to be totally
inadequate.
In a report, "Replacement of Roving Patrol Sounding
and Security Watch with Automation Based on T-AGOR 16
Installations," it was concluded that on the Patrol Frigate
it would cost $215,924 to purchase, install and maintain a
monitoring system to do the job of the sounding and security
watch [35]. The sounding and security life cycle cost had
been estimated at $600,000, resulting in a life cycle
savings of $384,076. This report demonstrates that the life
cycle cost of continuous manpower exceeds the life cycle
cost of a monitoring system by a significant amount. Were
any monitoring system able to demonstrate high reliability
and low false alarm rates, it could replace the sounding and
security watch.
The fire and flooding detection systems available on
most ships today consists of one or more temperature
thermostats in the ammunition magazines, temperature
thermostats and smoke detectors in missile magazines, if the
ship has them, and float switches to indicate high water
levels in the fire rooms, engine rooms and auxiliary
machinery rooms. Each magazine or compartment monitored has
19

an individual circuit wired to an alarm panel usually
located in Damage Control Central. The system is energized
at all times and will sound an alarm at two or more normally
manned locations. Appendix B contains a list and
description cf the monitoring and alarm systems installed in
the Coontz class destroyer. 1 These systems are typical of
most installed monitoring systems in the fleet today.
These systems are rugged, extremely reliable, and require
little maintenance. However, the systems are very limited
and the few expansions of the systems attempted have been
exceedingly expensive. Therefore, except to expand some
flooding systems to include the main engineering spaces, no
plans exist for extending the monitoring system on ships now
in operation. In spite of the costs, these systems have
been sufficiently successful in reducing casualties that new
ships are being built with a similar system throughout the
ship.
The system being installed on new ships consists of
two heat and smoke detectors per compartment or one for each
250 square feet of deck area and sensors to indicate high
water in most engineering spaces. These detectors are wired
directly from the compartment to an alarm box at a central
location. During initial construction the cost of
additional wiring and work required to install this
monitoring system is considerably less than the cost to add
wiring to a ship after construction has been completed.
The ships now in operation still have an expected
useful life of frpm 5-30 years and without adequate
monitoring the fire and flooding losses can be expected to
continue. Appendix A lists naval ship classes, their
1 A Coontz class DDG has been selected as a basis for
discussion because of the author 1 s familiarity with this
class and the fact that it represents an average size ship.
Appendix B contains information and tables applicable to
this ship class which will be referred to in the text.
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numbers, and approximate age. This list has been included
for a number of reasons. It gives an indication of the
types and variety of ships a damage control system must
protect. The age of each class is shown to indicate which
classes could not be economically equipped with a monitoring
system. One additional factor which would have a bearing on
whether a damage control system would be cost effective on
any class of ship is whether the particular class or type of
ship has had a high or low incidence rate of fire and
floodings. For instance, submarines represent 22% of the
total number of ships yet report only 1.19S of the flooding
incidents which amounts to 0.15% of total ship losses. For
fire they report 3.8% of the incidents representing 2.1% of
the total losses. Therefore, it would be uneconomical to
install further damage control monitoring systems on
submarines.
There are a total of 420 naval and military sea lift
command ships with a life expectancy of greater than ten
years. This assumes that each ship will be used thirty
years. Of the 420 ship total, 1 1 5 of them are submarines




II. MONITORIIG SYSTEM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
A. SCOPE OF THE MONITORING SYSTEM DESIGN
It is within the capability of present equipment to
detect fire by monitoring for high temperatures and smoke,
and to detect flooding by monitoring fluid levels or
pressure. Furthermore, the system could monitor the status
of equipment and systems. First, a system to detect
flooding is needed. This requires a fluid level indicator in
each compartment located below the water line and in certain
other compartments which have a fire main connection, sea
water cooling system, or other fluid system which could lead
to flooding. For the Coontz class destroyer (see Appendix
B) there are a total of 283 compartments, tanks and voids
meeting the above criteria.
Fire detection on a Coontz class destroyer poses an even
bigger problem as no area of the ship is immune to fire even
though some compartments are more susceptible and hazardous
than others. Complete coverage should be the goal for fire
detection. This would require 347 detectors excluding tanks
and voids. Equipment monitoring could require an additional
300 detectors. The total then would be approximately 1000
detectors of various types distributed throughout the ship.
There are various options for operation of the
detectors. The detectors could be sufficiently
sophisticated that they would individually monitor and sound
an alarm, or they could be unsophisticated sensors which
22

would relay conditions to a central location where the
decision to sound an alarm could be made.
The first approach assumes that someone will be close
enough to hear, see and react to an alarm, and is therefore
not much better than what is presently done. The second
approach would seem to have an advantage in that the sensors
used in such large proliferation could be inexpensive, while
the central location contained the more sophisticated
equipment capable of coping with any number of remote
sensors.
B. THE CENTRAL LOCATION
All ships maintain one or more places where there is
someone on watch at all times. In most ships Damage Control
Central (DCC) is one of these places; so this is the logical
control point or central location for a monitoring system.
If it is assumed that detectors are available and a means to
communicate from them to a central location has been
established, a method must be found to process the detector
intelligence for human consumption. The following devices
could be adapted for this purpose:
1. An indicator panel consisting of lights and alarms
would indicate the status of each detector. The technology
to build such a panel is presently available, and relatively
inexpensive. However any changes to the system would
require rewiring the panel, perhaps re-mounting and
re-labeling indicators and various other expensive
operations. Further the panels would need to be
individually designed for each class of ship.
2. A more mechanized device than above, where, through
23

relays or switches, each detector could be interrogated and
an output generated on conditions out of tolerance. Again
this is technologically feasible, but lacks flexibility.
3. A third approach is to use one of the recent
generation of microprocessors or microcomputers. The
microcomputer has proven itself capable of monitoring large
numbers of points or detectors and casts have become
comparable with most hardware monitoring methods.
The choice of a computer for the central processor has a
number of advantages:
a. It is relatively inexpensive.
b. It has capability for rapid data acquisition,
processing and dissemination.
c. The frequency of monitoring and the parameters
constituting abnormal conditions can be easily changed.
d. It is light, requires little power and space
and therefore is easily installed.
e. It is flexible in that changes in software
would adapt the computer to various sizes and types of ship.
f. Its capabilities may be increased by adding
more memory capacity..
g. The computer output can be made compatible
with other information systems currently in development
[8,14,24].
The addition of memory to the microcomputer could allow
for a number of additional options such as equipment
monitoring, analysis of the effect of flooding on ship
stability, and equipment vibration analysis. At the present
time the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center, San Diego,
California, is working on standardizing a microcomputer and




Detectors and sensors have been manufactured and used
for almost every physical parameter known. The difficulty
here is to select sensors which can meet the demanding
environment in which they are expected to perform. In
general, reliability, ruggedness, and long life have a
premium over accuracy and sensitivity. Measurement for
water levels, smoke detection, and temperatures may be quite
inaccurate and yet suffice. More sophisticated measurements
such as voltages and vibrations require both more accuracy
and sensitivity.
The Naval Ship Engineering Center, Philadelphia
Division, is currently working on a project intended to
select and develop fire detection equipment which will
provide suitable alarms in machinery spaces, magazines and
living spaces and, in some cases, actuate automatic fire
extinguishing systems in time to prevent major damage [21].
The approach being used is to study detector and other
applicable fire literature, determine environmental
variables affecting detector performance and to measure
these variables aboard ship. Numerous detectors have been
procured for tests. Testing will consist of small scale
laboratory detector response tests and large scale burn
tests to evaluate detector performance. The large scale
Burn Test Site is a fully equipped Coontz class training
fireroom acquired from the Naval Boilerman School.
This project is further intended to develop Military
Specifications for detectors including laboratory




The Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C., has a
program to develop logic circuits to be used in conjunction
with commercially available fire detectors to eliminate
false alarms and provide a more sophisticated level of alarm
[15]. The concepts which are incorporated into the logic
are a sampling of ambient conditions at certain intervals,
performance of signal averaging and ability to compare
between averaged intervals. The comparison can be ussd to
determine a rate of rise or fall and the magnitude and
duration. The logic has four output levels corresponding to
four levels of alarm. The first is Standby, the second is
Check, the third is Alert, and the fourth is Full Alarm.
The logic has been breadboarded and tested with simulated
analog data.
The July 1976 issue of Cont rol En gineeri ng has an
article on various types of level sensors all of which are
sufficiently rugged to be candidates for a shipboard system
£2].
D. TRANSMISSION
A number of methods are available for transmission of
the detector data to the central processor. Among the
possibilities are radio telemetry techniques, sound
transmission, laser or optical fiber devices and two wire
transmission lines.
Radio telemetry, while reducing the requirement to
install wiring, etc., would be difficult to maintain and
would interfere with existing communication equipment.
Sound transmission is impractical for a number of reasons
such as high ambient noise and compartmentalization which
would necessitate numerous retransmissions.
26

Laser and fiber optics technology promises to provide a
viable transmission method for a monitoring system aboard
ship [30]. A number of projects are currently underway to
test and evaluate fiber optics aboard ships and aircraft.
The preliminary results have been very successful and future
monitoring systems will very likely use this technology.
There are two reasons, however, that would rule out fiber
optics for this proposed system. First, the expense of
back-fitting a system requiring access to every compartment
on a ship is prohibitive, and prevents the installation of
present systems on older ships. Second, if installation
were to take place, there is little need to install a
transmission device with the broad band capabilities of
fiber optics when a simple two wire system would suffice.
As previously stated, the cost of installing two wire
transmission lines is prohibitive. However, transmitting
information (data) signals over existing cabling has seme
possibilities. For example, LCDR D. E. Bienlien in a thesis
"A Frequency-Division Multiplex System for Use in Shipboard
Internal Voice Communications," describes the building and
testing of a voice communication system utilizing the
bandwidth between fifty and two hundred kilohertz [3 J. The
system used the existing sound-powered telephone lines. The
sound-powered telephone system aboard ship, though guile
extensive, still does not reach all areas whore damage
control monitoring would be desirable. It was also found
that the sound powered head sets would require modification
because non-linearities in the electrical response of the
head sets demodulated the data on the carrier frequency.
The only cabling presently installed that reaches nearly
every compartment aboard ship is the 60Hz lighting and power
distribution system. Power line carrier systems have been
used extensively in Europe to control loads, monitor
switching, and maintain internal communications within the
27

power distribution system. This method has been used
successfully for commercially produced intercoms [29] and
remote audio speaker [31] installations. Power line carrier
systems in use by power companies have carrier frequencies
up to 500 kHz thus allowing for a number of simultaneous
channels [26,32], The short distances involved and
therefore the signal power needed aboard ship would minimize
the effect of radio frequency interference.
The Naval Ship Engineering Command, Hyattsville,
Maryland, was asked to comment on the use of a power line
carrier alarm system [19,20]. Their reply was to caution
that the addition of an RF signal in the lighting circuit
wiring is undesirable since the signal will be radiated
within the shipboard environment, potentially causing
interference to electronic systems. They however suggested
the following considerations be applied in the design of
such a system:
1. Signals radiated into electronic equipment
spaces or conducted on power lines to electronic equipment
by the alarm system should not exceed the KIL-SID-461
requirements for equipment susceptibility.
2. A carrier frequency between 30 kHz and 100 kHz
should be used, avoiding common Navy users in this range
such as Loran "C" at 100 kHz. Harmonic content of the
telemetry signal should not exceed 2 MHz to preclude
interference with HF receiving systems. The 30 kHz to 100
kHz frequency range is recommended because (1) signals in
this range can be transmitted along lighting circuits with
minimal attenuation, (2) minimal E and H field radiation
occurs at these frequencies from shipboard wiring, and (3)
this part of the electromagnetic spectrum is relatively free
from heavy use.
3. The telemetry signal level should be as low as





Regardless of the type or manufacture of any sensor for
the monitoring system, the sensitivity to each parameter
must be measured, and the conditions which would require an
alarm must be determined.
1 . Floo ding
Consider first the flooding situation, and look at
the conditions under which the sensor must operate. Some
compartments aboard ship, such as storerooms, magazines, and
voids, should essentially remain dry and any amount of water
or other fluids would constitute an alarm condition.
Engineering compartments, on the other hand, contain some
water at all times as the result of the constant water
leakage used to cool pump packings and the routine small
leaks at fittings and valves. These compartments usually
contain bilge pockets to collect this water. The bilge
pockets are then periodically pumped to holding tanks or to
sea. Often, however, when both the holding tanks and bilge
pockets are full, the water is allowed to continue its rise
because the Environmental Pollution Control Act prohibits
the discharge to sea of wastes in ports, rivers and along
the seacoast. In most cases the increased water level does
not constitute a hazardous condition until it has reached a
level several feet above the bilge pockets and approaches
the level of pumps, motors and other equipment that could be
damaged. Therefore there are two normal situations which
constitute an alarm condition, when the bilge pocket is
full, and when the level approaches equipment. Neither of




There is also the situation of catastropic flooding
such as when a pipe breaks or a valve is inadvertently left
open. In this situation a substantial increase in water
level in a short period of time constitutes an emergency
alarm.
Assuming that a central processor at a remote site
will be making the decisions, a sensor must provide
sufficient data for the decision to be made. Obviously the
easiest methcd would be to install a simple ON-OFF switch at
the highest point the level should be allowed to reach. In
the case of a normally dry compartment the switch would.be
installed as low as possible. In wet compartments the
switch should be installed at higher levels. It can be
assumed that normally dry compartments have emergency
flooding conditions when the switch comes "ON". In a wet
compartment this is not true and an "ON" condition may mean
only that routine pumping is required. In wet compartments
then, additional ON-OFF switches would be needed for the
emergency situation. The number of switches needed and the
requirement to maintain and test them appears to require
that other methods be investigated.
A continuous or incremental sensor would seem to be
the answer in both wet and dry compartments. It would
indicate the fluid level from zero to any desired level.
The rate of rise could be determined by the central
processor and an alarm could be sounded as necessary. A
further advantage is that only one kind of sensor would be
needed.
The next determination is the sensitivity of the
fluid level sensor. This depends on the additional uses of
water level information. For instance, if the system is
intended to be capable of determining ship stability then
the sensor must be able to indicate a substantial number of
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levels between empty and full. If the system is limited to
monitoring the level above which an emergency exists then a
relatively few levels would suffice. There then must be a
trade off between the complexity of the sensor and the
number of levels the sensor can indicate.
As with any system the sensor information must be
converted to an electrical signal. This signal may be a
variable frequency, current, or voltage. Voltages between
0-10 volts or ±5 volts are most commonly used and any
frequency or current can be converted to a voltage in this
range. Most level sensors on the market provide a voltage
output.
2. Fire
There are four stages in a fire's development [13].
The early or incipient stage is characterized by the thermal
decomposition of combustible materials. The gases and
particles produced at this stage are invisible. The second
or smoldering stage produces larger particles visible as
smoke. The third or flame stage results in heat igniting
gases and particles. The heat ignition of gases and
particles is followed quickly by the final high heat stage
which results in rapidly expanding flames.
Detection of fire is dependent on recognizing a
fire's signature [J2,18], -In the two initial stages of a
fire, detection depends for the most part on sensing the
presense of aerosols, the small particles of combustion
which, when large enough, appear as smoke. To a lesser
extent the gas signature, oxygen depletion and an increase
in carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, may be used to
indicate the presence of fire. In the later stages of a
fire, detection merely depends on sensing the vast amount of
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energy released in the form of radiation. Infrared,
visible, and ultraviolet radiation can be detected directly
or may be detected by an increase in temperature.
The environmental conditions for heat sensing are
similar to those for flooding in that some compartments are
normally at a comfortable living temperature while
engineering spaces normally operate at somewhat higher
temperatures. Here again an emergency alarm condition may
be dependent on either a temperature above a certain level
(different for each compartment) or on a sudden increase in
temperature.
As with flooding detectors, the heat sensor could be
a simple ON-OFF device set to a given temperature but this
method would require that the set point either be high
enough for any compartment or set differently for each
compartment. A single set point has the disadvantage that
compartments with low ambient temperatures would have to
have a considerable amount of heat introduced to reach the
alarm condition. This would require that a fire b€ well
underway prior to the alarm being sounded. The object of
the system is to discover the fire and alert personnel to
put the fire out before the fire becomes uncontrollable.
Individual compartment set points would require an involved
procedure to determine set points and check the proper alarm
temperature. The temperature sensor must be able to indicate




III. STAlLg-OF-THE-ART IN DATA-ACQUISITION SYSTEMS
A. WHAT IS DATA ACQUISITION?
In the terminology used today, data acquisition is the
process which interfaces a control unit to the "real" analog
world [4,33]. In a damage control application, the real
world of interest consists of parameters such as fluid
level, temperature, smoke level, etc. Most data acquisition
systems (DAS) now on the market cost several thousands of
dollars. The cost depends primarily on the number of inputs
and the speed at which the DAS can process the inputs.
A typical DAS in use today might be a large rack-mounted
device weighing 50 >pounds or more, consuming over 100 watts
of power and having 256 input channels. It is generally
hard wired to the sensors and requires pre-amplif ication or
other costly signal conditioning in order to obtain the
accuracy and immunity to external electrical noise required
for remote sensors.
All data acquisition systems usually contain the same
component nucleus. A typical system would consist of an
analog multiplexer, an instrumentation buffer amplifier, one
or more sample-and-hold amplifiers, a high speed
analog-to^digital converter, and a logic control section
which controls the input selection and timing for the entire
data acquisition process. The system is designed to take a
set of analog inputs and convert them to digital values for
use by a process controller or computer.
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B. MAKING THE DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM SMALLER
With the advances in micro-circuit techniques over the
past few years it is now possible to obtain a complete data
acquisition system on a single printed circuit board for
several hundred dollars. These DAS*s contain the same
component nucleus as the older and larger systems but use
integrated circuits as building blocks for the system.
The trend toward smaller and less expensive data
acquisition systems can be expected to continue. A number
of companies have produced products within the last year
that can be integrated into an inexpensive system. For
instance, Analog Devices, Inc., has a sample-and-hold
amplifier that sells for $5.95 where the range had
previously been from $25-$253, Teledyne Semiconductor has
an eight-bit analog-digital converter for $9.95 compared to
previous components ranging from $19-$195.
Micro Networks Corporation through the application of
thin-film hybrid technology has produced a complete eight
channel data acquisition system in a single 32-pin
dual-in-line package (DIP) [5]. The device, MN7100, sells
for $140 each in 100-unit lots. Data Translation, Inc., has
a low cost data acquisition module, DT820, selling for $130
in quantities of J00 [7]. This unit also contains eight
channels in a 32-pin DIP. It can be expected that other
companies will shortly produce similar DAS's at competitive
prices. A block diagram of the Micro Networks device is





























































Although there are no single-chip data acquisition
systems presently available, several manufacturers have
plans to design such devices. These DAS's will serve the
automobile industry by digitizing fuel and emission control
information for use in a dedicated microprocessor [6].
The use of one or more small eight channel data
acquisition systems in each compartment of a ship would
allow sufficient flexibility and capacity to make a very
effictive monitoring detector. A possible use for the
channels is shown in Table III.
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Table III. - USE FOR DAS CHANNELS IN A COMPARTMENT
C. DAS INTERFACING
In most instances the data acquisition system has been
an integral part of the process controller. However, with
the advent of small individual DAS's it is now possible to
place the DAS at some remote location away from the process
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controller and to have the controller receive inputs from a
number of DAS's. The DAS then must transmit its digital
data to the controller.
Digital data transmission can be in parallel or in
serial. Considering that the bandwidth of a power line
carrier is sufficient for frequency division multiplexing,
such a method is one possible way to send eight bits in a
bit parallel byte serial mode from DAS to controller [34],
Speed of transmission using this method is the advantage but
hardware costs to generate eight accurate carrier
frequencies and as many transmitters at each DAS would
appear to rule out this method.
Serial digital-data transmission, though considerably
slower, would be much less expensive. Serial interface
integrated circuit chips are manufactured by a number of
companies, some selling for under $10 [9,10], These chips
are commonly called "Universal Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitters" or UART's. The UART sends and
receives binary characters or words consisting of a start
bit, seven or eight data bits, -a parity bit and two stop
bits. Because of the single start bit used for
synchronization of the received data the UART does not work
well in a noisy environment. A noisy environment may be
overcome by use of redundant transmission methods such as
retransmission and error correcting coding [1,36,37],
Therefore, even though use of a UART appears to be a very
attractive choice, field testing is required to determine
whether a UART is feasible for use aboard ship or whether it
will be necessary to use more involved circuitry.
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IV. THE MONITORING SYSTEM
A. PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS
At this point the discussion will focus on one
particular monitoring system design proposal. Briefly, the
proposed monitoring system consists of a series of sensors
within each compartment wired to a data acquisition system
which converts the sensor's information to a digital signal
and transmits the data via the power line to a central
processor. Figure 4 is a block diagram of the system.
1 . Sensors
The sensors of the system consist of solid state low
voltage temperature, smoke, fluid level and intrusion
devices which provide proper voltages to the data acquisi-
tion system. The solid state temperature monitor provides
an output between ±10 volts, representing temperature
between -6°F and +25G°F. The smoke detector's output ranges
±10 volts depending pn the density and diameter of the smoke
particles present in the vicinity of the sensor. The fluid
level detector is a resistive or capacitive voltage divider
network which indicates fluid level in one half inch
increments from zero to 10 feet. The intrusion detector is
an ultrasonic pulse doppler motion detector. Its advantage
is that not only will it detect movement in the vicinity,
bat will also detect the motion of loose gear which could



















































2« Data Acquisition System
The data acquisition system consists of an eight
channel multiplexer, sample and hold amplifier, analog to
digital converter, control sequencing logic, a universal
asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) , and a frequency
modulated power line carrier receiver/transmitter. The data
acquisition system receives an analog voltage proportional
to the parameter a detector is measuring and converts the
analog voltage to a digital eight-bit data word. The data
word is then shifted in parallel to the UART where the word
is converted to a serial string of pulses with a parity
check bit added. This string of pulses is used to modulate
an RF carrier which is impressed on the power line of the
ship's 60 Hz power distribution system. The control
sequencing lcgic causes the multiplexer to sequence through
all eight input channels each time the data acquisition
system is polled by the central processor.
3 • The Cent ra l Processor
The central processor polls the compartment data
acquisition system, receives the data and processes it. The
processor also controls the display units and conducts
diagnostic routines to determine system operability.
So as to facilitate installation, the central
processor is compact and does not require its own air
conditioning and environmental control system. The
processor can be carried on board a ship, plugged in and be
ready to operate. System software will be installed when
the processor is delivered to a ship.
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The damage control system central processor hardware
is postulated to meet military specifications for shipboard
use even though such specifications increase costs
significantly. The size of memory and speed of the
processor depend on the number of applications chosen for
implementation. The system should be able to poll a 1,000
compartment/equipment installation twice a minute, under
normal no alarm conditions. Alarm conditions may slow down
operation, but it is unlikely that more than one compartment
would have unreported alarm conditions at one time.
Nevertheless, processing known alarms should have priority
over the polling of compartments which might have alarms. A
further discussion of the central processor appears in
Section C below.
4. Control and Display
Thus far there has been no discussion concerning the
output device or devices to be used with this system.
Teletypes have been used for most shipboard applications,
but a damage control system requires an output device on the
bridge, on the quarterdeck, and in damage control central.
None of these locations are suitable for teletype use.
There has been some work at the Naval Electronics Laboratory
Center, San Diego, California, to identify a suitable
terminal for use in locations aboard ship where there is no
controlled environment.
OBJECTIVES AND APPLICATIONS
The initial objective of the damage control monitoring
system is to immediately alert the Damage Control Officer
and the Captain, Officer of the Deck or Quarterdeck Watch
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Officer of fire and flooding aboard the ship. Toward this
end the monitoring system provides the central processor
with sufficient data to determine that fire or flooding is
in progress.
Given the system as proposed and the data it can
provide, there are numerous applications which can be
considered. Figure 5 delineates some of the applications.
Each application has its costs in terms of computational
power in the central processor and the time required to
perform the necessary calculations. Each application also
will have its costs in terms of program overhead and program
development. Some programs can be general enough to be
applied on any ship while others will require a certain
amount of tailoring to fit specific classes of ship or
possibly one specific ship.
The monitoring system will provide data which previously
had been either unattainable or attainable only after an
excessively long period to time. The system is expected to
operate at all times including periods when battle damage
has been suffered unless that damage has left the ship
without electrical power. It is expected that by
significantly reducing the reaction time to respond to




DATA PROVIDED FOR EACH COMPARTMENT
•Temperature
•Smoke or Particulate Concentration Level
•Fluid Level
•Intrusion or Motion Indication








Access Routes to Compartment
Egress Routes frcm Compartment
Hazards Associated with Compartment




Possible Source (s) of Flooding
Method of Isolating Each Source
Equipment, etc. Endangered
-Weight and Moment Arm Calculations




•Equipment Monitoring and Status
-Detection of Malfunctions
-Logging of Equipment Parameters
-Equipment Vibration and Sound Analysis




Applications of the damage control monitoring system are
primarily dependent on the central processor and its
software. The central processor is required to poll the
compartments, verify the data received, analyze the data,
determine if an alarm condition exists, and report the
damage control status. The processor is expected to filter
and average compartment data in order to reduce false
alarms. It is also to consider more than one environmental
parameter, if available, in order to increase the confidence
level of alarms.
Figure 6 is a flow chart of a polling routine which is
intended to reduce false alarms due to transmission errors.
The compartment polling routine begins by polling a specific
compartment, then waiting for a response. If an error in
transmission were to occur when the compartment was polled
the compartment may not respond. Therefore, repeated
attempts are made to get the compartment to respond prior to
issuing an error message indicating that a particular
compartment can not be contacted. If the compartment
responds, the receiver is checked for parity, framing and
overrun transmission errors and the data are checked to see
that they are within given limits. If either transmission
errors or data errors persist an error message is generated.
It is now assumed that the data are valid and
calculations are made to determine ambient conditions, rate
of change, and the difference from the ambient condition..
The results of these calculations are compared with a set
point and if they persist in exceeding the set point then an









Figure 6 - POLLING ROUTINE FLOW DIAGRAM
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or a number of values obtained from a table corresponding to
the type of compartment (ie. , magazine, control center,
etc.). As such, the polling routine would be independent of
the type of ship and could be considered as a separate
entity. More useful set points for a given compartment
would be a function of the compartment location, size, . and
type of hazards associated with it. The Coast Guard and
National Bureau of Standards as well as a number of other
organizations have conducted studies and experiments to
determine the rate of temperature rise and smoke levels
expected for given hazards. The research was intended to
obtain criteria for activation of automatic fire suppression
and extinguishing systems. Determining set points for a
specific compartment would require a data base of
information about the ship. This data base would require
additional software and hardware assets to implement, but
the additional assets and the initial determination of set
points could be handled at a shore-based facility.
If more than one parameter is available, the confidence
level of alarms can be improved. For instance, if the
system were to detect an increased heat and increased smoke
level, it should determine that an alarm exists with the
same confidence that would result with either a rapid rise
in temperature or a rapid rise in smoke level. A rapid rise
in both temperature and smoke levels should indicate an




1 . Casu alty_ Cost Reduction
The early detection of fire and flooding has the
potential to reduce the material losses resulting from these
casulties by greater than 50%. A monitoring system may also
prevent loss of life and will reduce non-material costs
associated with casualties such as the time and manpower
used to combat the casualty, clean up after it, conduct
investigations into Causes and effects and to process the
inevitable reports and papers required when any casualty
occurs. If the monitoring system proves sufficiently
effective it will be possible to eliminate the Sounding and
Security Watch or assign the man to other more productive
duties.
2« Hardware Cost Reduction
The cost of the system itself will be considerably
less than the cost for a comparable hard wired system. For
example, the smoke detectors now used in missile magazines
excluding wiring, control panel, and installation, cost $285
each compared to an expected cost of $100 for the hardware
required to monitor a compartment for heat, smoke, flooding
and intrusion. Table IV, reproduced from Enclosure (1) of
Reference [35], "Replacement of Roving Patrol Sounding and
Security Watch with Automation Based on T-AGOR 16
Installations," shows equipment which would be required to
replace the sounding and security watch on the FFG. Table
V, from the same report, lists the expected cost of the
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Crew Living Complexes 1-4 10
CPO Living 2
CPO Mess 2 2
CPO Lounge 2 2
Galley ' 2 2












Motor Gen Rm + Degaussing 2 2
Emerg Prop Space 2 2
Refrig Machry Room 2 2
Steering Gear Rm 2 2
Sewage Treatment Rm 2 2


























































7,068 ft. at $ 20 per ft. $ 141,360
9 at 120 each 1,080
36 at 207 each 7,452
24 - at 100 each 2,400
18 at 50 each 900
99 at 200 per line 19,800
4 at 8000 per sys. 32,000
1 at 500 per sys. 500




Table V. - COST OF SENSING AND MONITORING EQUIPMENT FOR FFG
sensing and monitoring equipment required. More than 65% of
the total estimated cost of $215,924 is due to cabling.
Table VI lists the expected costs for the more extensive
system proposed in Paragraph A, above, which would monitor
the same compartments. The proposed system's estimated cost
at present is less than 143 of that in Table V.
3 • Fleetwide Implementation
In order to estimate the cost to implement the
proposed damage control monitoring system, some assumptions
must be made. The first assumption is that the system will
be implemented on all ships, except submarines, with a life
expectancy greater then 10 years. As was shown earlier this
would involve 305 ships. Second, there will be a 50-50
split between system development and hardware costs. Third,
the Coontz class destroyer represents an average size ship.
The Coontz class destroyer has 416 compartments, tanks and
voids which can be monitored.
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Cable NA NA SO
Sensors 37 at $ 100 each 3,700
Central Processor 1 at 15,000 each 15,000
Equipment Monitor 1 at 100 per sys. 100
System Maintenance, 20 yr. at 522 per yr. ^ 1C ,432
TOTAL $ 29,232
Table VI. - COST OF SENSING AND DATA ACQUISITION FOR FFG
OSING POWER LINE CARRIER.
Using the figures in Table VI, 416 compartment units
at $100 each equals $41,600, adding $15,000 for the central
processor, and allowing $1,000 per year for 20 years as the
system maintenance cost, an average installation would cost
$76,600. Doubling this figure to allow for system
development costs and multiplying by the number of
installations gives a figure of $46,726,000. With no other
benefits other than reduction of material losses due to fire
and flooding, the system would pay for itself in less than
10 years.
4. Maintenance and Installation
System maintenance costs are expected to be low.
The individual compartment units of the system will be
non-repairable and nearly maintenances ree due to the
expected long life of solid state devices. Diagnostic
routines will simplify troubleshooting of the central
processor.
Installation of the sensors and data acquisition
systems will be within the capability of ship»s force.
Installation of the central processor and the man-machine
interface should be within the capability of a tender or
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ship repair facility. System programming is within the
capability of a number of in-house organizations. Using a
do^-it-yourself approach to system installation will have an
additional benefit, other than cost, in that the personnel
involved with system installation will develop a vested
interest in system operation. This interest is likely to
reduce training requirements and reduce the number of
complaints resulting from any of the minor difficulties




There are quite a number of other considerations in
designing any system. Some of these will be discussed
briefly.
A. SAFETY
Safety involves a number of aspects from safety of the
system itself to safety of personnel operating the system.
As stated earlier, the introduction of an RF signal on the
power line has the potential to produce safety hazards. The
use of very low voltages both in the RF transmission and at
the detectors and sensors will reduce but not eliminate the
electrical hazards.
Another area of safety concern is how will the alarm
conditions of the system be treated. For instance, any time
there is an emergency aboard ship, personnel normally use
extraordinary means to get to proper stations and to prepare
to combat the emergency. Therefore false alarms or genuine
alarms of a minor nature could result in unnecessary





Implementation of the damage control system will allow
two significant changes in standard operating procedures
aboard ship. First, the Sounding and Security Watch can be
changed from a roving watch to a working watch. That is,
the watch could spend more of his time doing routine chores
such as pumping bilges, adjusting system line-ups and
performing maintenance checks. Under the present system the
watch is prohibited from doing such chores because they
require him to remain in one location too long. The second
change in operating procedure is in the way the ship's crew
reacts to a casualty when it is discovered- At the present
time it can usually be correctly assumed that when a
casualty is discovered it is sufficiently serious to require
an all hands effort to combat the casualty. Therefore,
damage control parties are assembled and fully equipped
prior to proceeding to the vicinity of the casualty. These
precautions are tijne consuming, but necessary to prevent
loss of life. The damage control monitoring system will
provide the exact location of the casualty, and can estimate
its severity. This information would allow a two step
approach to combating casualties. First, two or three
persons can be dispatched to take care of small casualties
confined to one compartment. The remainder of the crew
would then take steps to provide back-up support. In many
instances two or three properly trained persons arriving






Where the proposed monitoring system depends on the
ship's power distribution system, any interruption in power
will prevent the system from operating. Power interruptions
on the entire ship, though seemingly quite frequent, are of
short duration. Inadvertant power losses can be detected by
failure of the system to communicate with one or more
detectors. However, power may be secured to some areas of
the ship for extended periods while maintenance or repairs
are effected. Intentional securing of power should include
providing temporary fire watches in the powerless areas.
BATTLE DAMAGE
Battle damage will normally result in power losses to
various portions of the ship and can be treated very much
like service interruptions above.
PERSONNEL
Personnel are required for maintenance and operation of
all systems. Most ships now have or will shortly have
computer maintenance personnel for other systems. These
personnel could be used to maintain this system's central
processor. System operation can be essentially automatic or





It is recommended that one of the Navy organizations now
working on damage control systems such as the Naval Research
Laboratory, the Naval Ship Engineering Center, or the Naval
Electronics Laboratory Center be tasked to build and test a
prototype monitoring system similar to the one proposed in
this thesis.
A. BUILDING THE PROTOTYPE
It is estimated that a complete prototype system could
be produced for less than $5,000. This includes a central
processor, control and display unit, data acquisition system
and sensors. If a computer and display unit are already
available the cost would be substantially less.
B. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
The area of fire sensors is under investigation by at
least two Navy organizations [15,21] and at least one is
investigating microprocessors [28], There has been a
feasibility study at the Naval Research Laboratory and Naval
Ship Engineering Center on power line carrier data
transmission [25]. As a prototype for a power line carrier
system had not been built, it was felt that this thesis
would be incomplete without some work in this area.
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A breadboard circuit was built to demonstrate that the
concept proposed in this thesis would work well enough to
warrant a recommendation for further development. The
circuit consisted of a data acquisition module, Micro
Networks MN7100, a General Instrument UART, a power line
receiver/transmitter and a number of other integrated
circuits used to control the operation. The entire cost was
less than $400. Power line transmission of data readings
sampled from environmental sensors were successfully made
with the system. This demonstrated the feasibility of using
the above circuitry and provided the impetus to recommend
further development testing.
C. SYSTEM TESTING
System testing is an integral part of any system's
development. Testing in the early stages of development
demonstrates that individual portions of a system meet
desired goals. Testing at later stages exercises the system
under normal and adverse operating conditions. Testing is
also required prior to approval of funding at each stage in
development and prior to any purchase of completed systems.
At this stage in system development, only an outline for
early tests can be provided.
The prototype tests should include determinations of the
data rates possible with the system, of the power levels
required for effective data transfers and of the error rates
which occur in data transmission. As it is nearly
impossible to simulate the environment aboard ship, it will
be necessary to conduct much of the testing on board ship.
This, however, will allow determinations of radiated RF





Prior to any decision to purchase hardware or develop
software for a damage control system, there should be
positive steps to control costs. Therefore, it is
recommended that design to cost procedures be used and that,
considering the scope and impact of the system on the fleet,
a project manager be assigned to insure that there is one




This thesis has shown that a shipboard damage control
system is desirable and feasible and that it can be
developed using existing technology. The recent
technological developments in microcircuit techniques
accompanied by price reductions have made possible the
development of inexpensive components for a damage control
monitoring system. Using these advances in technology, a
shipboard fire and flooding detection system consisting of a
central processor connected by power line carrier to a
series of inexpensive detectors has the potential to
directly reduce 48% of the losses due to fires and 61% of
the losses due to floodings. A prototype compartment
detector has been buj.lt and tested at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Preliminary results of limited testing on the
prototype detector has shown that it can perform as a useful
part of a larger monitoring system. Using the concept
demonstrated by the prototype detector, sufficient data can
be provided for a number of applications in addition to
detection of fire and flooding. However, each application
needs to be justified on its own merit because it will
require separate central processor software development and
will require additional hardware. The potential benefits of
the proposed damage control system are sufficient to warrant
further developments The Navy can ill afford to overlook
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CGU-9 1 17,350 721 30 73 17
CGN-25 1 8,590 565 25 58 15
CGN-35 1 9,200 564 31 58 10
CGN-36 2 11,100 596 32 61 2-3
CGN-38 1of4i 10,000 585 31 63 1
CG-10 2 17,500 674 34 71 31-32
CG-16 9 7,800 533 25 55 13-15







391 20 41 31-32
391 21 41 28
418 22 45 18-21






















































































































































































































































620 27 108 6-7
820 26 106 0-3
602 29 34 7-16
564 28 76 23
550 28 82 7-9
564 27 76 22-23
522 22 104 14
569 22 105 6-12
510 20 90 20-22
555 18 84 4-8
56 7 15 68 5-8
172 14 36 18-23
(55)
AD- 14 5 18,r 000 531 26 73 33-37
AD-26 2 16,,900 492 28 70 31
AD-37 2of6i 22,r 260 645 23 85 10
AE-21 5 17,r 400 512 29 72 17-21
AE-26 8 19,,937 564 28 81 4-9
AF-58 1 15 ,500 502 29 72 21
AFS-1 7 16,,263 581 24 79 7-13
AG- 153 2 16,,076 564 31 76 23
AGDS-2 1 14,,000 492 22 78 19
AGEH-1 1 3 20 212 25 40 11
AGF-3 1 13,,900 522 23 104 30
AGP-1176 1 7,,100 445 18 62 19
AO- 1 77 0of9i 27 ,500 589 35 88
AO-143 5 38 ,000 655 35 86 21-23
AO.E-1 4 52,,483 793 38 107 7-13


































































































































































































































































520 29 72 21
455 24 62 32
455 22 62 32
522 25 65 33
209 15 38 10-14
246 19 75 6
455 28 62 31
285 15 48 7-12
393 15 54 8
455 29 62 26-27
520 32 72 27
262 19 51 19
454 27 66 16
455 22 62 7-14
459 26 63 33
499 27 78 19
540 27 83 9
52 4 31 68 31-33
644 36 75 30-31
655 35 86 21
620 32 84 19-20
615 32 80 18
587 32 84 2-3
325 19 48 31
370 18 47 32




1 Total number planned or building for class
2 Class has a damage control monitoring system
3 Number with a life expectancy of more than ten years
Class chosen as the representative for purposes of
discussing a damage control monitoring system.




THE COONTZ CLASS GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER
A. COONTZ CLASS GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYERS
USS Farragut DDG-37 USS Mahan DDG-42
USS Luce DDG-38 USS Dahlgren DDG-43
USS MacDonough DDG-39 USS W.V. Pratt DDG-44
USS Coontz DDG-40 USS Dewey DDG-45






Berthing Accommodations: Officers 26
CPO 24
Crew 336
Propulsion Machinery: 2 Shafts 35,000 SHP
4 12001b Boilers
Armament: Standard Missile
Mk 76 Mod 8 Missile Fire Control System
Mk 10 Guided Missile Launching System
Mk 68 Gun Fire Control System
5"/54 Cal. Single Gun Mount
ASROC
2 Mk 32 Triple Torpedo Tubes
Radars: AN/SPS^10B Navigation
A31/SPS-29C 2-D Air Search
AN/SPS-48 3-D Air Search
AN/SPG-35 Gun Fire Control
2 AN/SPG-55B Missile Fire Control
Boats: 26 C02 15 Man Lifeboats Capacity 390
1 33* Mk 2 Utility Boat 45
1 28' Mk 6 Personnel Boat 22




1 • HiSli Temperature Alarm System
This system provides a means of detection and
warning of fire or high temperature conditions in selected
compartments, where it is desirable to keep a constant
check. The system consists of a 30 line high temperature
alarm panel located in damage control central (DCC) . There
are audible and visual alarms locally in DCC and remotely at
the quarterdeck and in the pilot house. A local malfunction
alarm also indicates system grounds and open circuits. Each
line to the alarm panel has one or more series- connected
mercury bulb thermostats within a compartment set at 105°F,
125°F, or 150°F depending on the flammable characteristics
of the materials stored in the given compartment. Any one
of the thermostats at a temperature above the rated
temperature will cause sufficient current to flow to operate
an alarm relay. The following is a list of the compartments
monitored by the high temperature alarm system.
COMPT^ NO^ COMPARTMENT NAME NO. THERMOSTATS
4-23-0-M 5"/54 Cal. HR and PJCTL Stwg * 5
4-32-0-M 5"/54 Cal. Powder Magazine # 4
3-148-3-M Small Arms Magazine # 2
3-151-1-M Saluting Powder Magazine # 2
3-157-0-M Missile Magazine (1st Plat.) * 8
3-157-0-M Missile Magazine (2nd Plat.) #* 6
1-50-3-A Rifle and Pistol Locker 2
1-157-0-M Missile Assembly Area #* 4
1-170-0-M Missile Check Out Area * 2
6-20-0-K Flammable Liquids Storeroom n 2
5-20-0-K Flammable Liquids Storeroom 2
1-41-4-A Paint Mixing and Issue Room 2
# Compartment contains an automatically actuated sprinkler
system and a sprinkling alarm system as described in section
3 below.
* These compartments also contain smoke detectors as
described in section 2 below,




2. Combustion Gas and Smoke Detector Alarm System
The function of this system is to provide a means of
detecting the presence of combustion gas and smoke in the
selected compartments. This system consists of one four
circuit alarm panel, alarms, and nineteen ionization type
detector heads located in the missile magazine, assembly and
loading area and check out area. An impurity such as smoke
or gas of combustion in the air near the detector head will
activate the alarm at the panel in DCC and remote alarms on
the quarterdeck and in the pilot house.
3- Spri nkler Alarm System
This system provides a means of detection and
warning when water is present in the magazine sprinkling
system, whether the presence of water is due to opening of
the magazine group control valve or leakage past the valve.
The system is of the closed circuit type and detects and
indicates operation of the sprinkling system and the
compartment affected. The list in paragraph 1, above,
indicates those compartments monitored by the sprinkler
alarm system. This system uses an alarm arrangement similar
to that of the fire and smoke detection systems above.
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**• Floo ding Alarm System*
This system provides a means of detection and
warning when the liquid level in selected compartments
reaches a predetermined level. The system consists of two
or more liquid level switches in the selected compartments
connected to an alarm panel in DCC. There is a remote alarm
at the guarterdeck. The system will cover those
compartments listed below:
Fwd Fire Room 400 Hz M/G Room No.
2
Aft Fire Room I.C. M/G Room No.1
Fwd Engine Room I.C. M/G Room No. 2
Aft Engine Room ASW Equipment Room




Pump Room Fwd I.C. Gyro S Plotting Rm.
A/C Machinery Room No.1 Aft I.C. Gyro & Plotting Rm.
A/C Machinery Room No.
2
Missile Magazine
400 Hz M/G Room tfo.
1
S.D. Storeroom (Electronics)
This system has not as yet been installed in any ships of
this class, however, the ship alteration has been approved
and issued as SHIPALT DL3-9-362. Installation is planned









04 LEVEL 2 Compartments
04-65- 0-C*





























































Radar & NTDS Coolant Rm
02-112-4-Q* Fan Room
02-112-2-L* Passageway
02-112-0-Q* Air Nav Eauip Rm
02-113-0-Q* Fan Room
02-118-1-Q* Fan Room
02-123-1-Q* Stack Damper Housing
02-141-2-Q* Fan Room
02-141-0-Q* Msl Dir Pwr Rm #1
02-141-1-Q* Fan Room
02-148- 2-Q* Msl Dir Prw Rm #2
02-148-0-L* Passageway
02- 148-1
-C* Auxiliary Radio Rm
02-150-0-Q* Photo Lab
02-151-0-Q* Msl Dir Machy Rm #1





























































COMPT. NO.* COMPARTMENT NAME2
FIRE3 FLOODING HAZARD
HAZARD HAZARD* RANK S
01 LEVEL 35 Compartments
01-55-2-Q ASROC Rammer Rail Lckr A 2
01-56-0-A* Ord Component Strm A 2
01-56-1-L* Passageway C 11
01-59-0-L* Wardroom A,C 10
01-65-0-L* Passageway C P 11






01-70-4-Q* Fan Room A,C W 13
01-70-2-C* Main Communication Ctr A,C 9
01-70-0-C* UHF Radio Rm A,C 15
01-70-1-C* Radar Rm #1 A,C 14
01-70-3-Q* Deck Gear Locker A 7
01-92-0-Q* Fan Room A,C W,P 13
01-101-0-C* OHF Radio Rm #2 A,C 15
01-105-0-Q* Radio Transmitter Rm A,C 15
01-112-0-Q* Radar Rm #3 A,C 14
01-112-1-Q* Radar Rm #4 A,C 14
01-133-2-Q* CCTV Studio A,C
01-133-0-L* Operations Off SR
Officers Head
A,C W 10
01-137-1-L* A s,w 3
01-138-2-Q* Electrical Workshop A,C 10
01-138-0-Q* Fan Room A,C w 13
01-138-1-L* Passageway C 11
01-141-0-Q* Msl Dir Pwr Equip Rm A,C
01-141-1-L* Weapons Officers SR A,C w 10
01-148-2-C* Msl Dir Control Rm A,C
01-148-0-L* Passageway C F 11
01-148-1-Q* Fan Room A,C W 13
01-151-1-L* Passageway C 11
01-153-0-C* Msl Dir Equip Rm A,C
01-159-2-Q* Fan Room A,C w 13
01-159-0-Q* Msl Dir Machy Rm #2 A. C. 7
MAIN DECK 92 Compartments
Mount 51 5»/54 Cal Mount #51
1-38-0-Q* Barber Shop
1-38-1-0* fan Room
1-41-4-A* Paint Mix-Issue Rm [340]
1-41-2-A* Medical Strm #1 [175]
1-41-0-L* Passageway
1-41-1-Q* ASROC Lchr Equip Rm
1-44-2-Q* Fan Room
1-44-Q-L* Passageway
1-44- 1-A* Reg Pub Locker
1-44-3-Q* Fan Rm & Gear Locker






















































































































































1-50-0-L* Chief Staff Off SR
1-50-1-L* Passageway
1-50-3-A* Rifle & Pistol Locker











1-68-4-Q* Civ Clothes Laundry
-68-2-L* Passageway
-68-0-E Uptake Space #1
-68--1-L* Passageway
-68-3-Q* Comm Mulching Rm
-72-2-L Vestibule
-72-1-A* Rain Clothes Locker
-75-2-Q* Food Preparation Area
-76-1-L* Passageway
-76-3-Q* Damage Control Repair V
-80-1-Q* Radar Rm" #1A
-84-1-A* Provision Issue Rm [495]
-88-0-Q* Crews Galley
-88-01-L* Crews Mess
-112-4-Q* Filter Cleaning Rm
-112-2-L* Passageway
-112-0-E Uptake Space #2
-112-1-L* Passageway
-112-3-L* Passageway




-123-2-Q* Oil & Water Test Lab
-126-1-L Vestibule
-127-2-Q* Ships Store
-128-1-Q* Damage Cont Repair III
-132-2-L* Passageway
-132- 1-L* Passageway






-137-2-A* Helo Oper Gear Strm
-137-1-Q* Disbursing Office






COMPT. NO.* COMPARTMENT NAME 2
FIHE3 FLOODING HAZARD
HAZARD HAZARD* BANK 5
1-141-0-L* Supply Off SR A, c w 10
1-144- 2-L* Gunnery Off SR A, c w 10
1-144-0-L* Stateroom A c w 10
1-148-4-L* Stateroom a; c w 10
1-148-2-L* Passageway C 11
1-148-0-L* Stateroom A, c R 10
1-148-01-L* Passageway C F,P 11
1-148-1-Q* Fan Room A, c w 13
1-150-1-Q* Weapons Office A, c 10
1-151-2-L* Exec Off SR A, c w 10
1-153-0-L* Stateroom A, c w 10




1-157-0-M* H M 29
1-157-1-L* Passageway C 11
1-167-2-Q* Fan Room C W 13




1-170-0-M* H M 29
1-170-0-L* Passageway c 11
1-174-1-Q* Fan Room c W 13
1-175-2-Q* Fan Room c W 13

































Emergency Gen Rm #1




Mt 51 Gun Carrier Rm
Crews Head
























































































COMPT. NO.i COMPARTMENT NAME* HAZARD HAZARD* RANK 5
2-107-2-L* Passageway C 11
2-148-4-L* CPO Lounge A F 11
2-148-2-L* CPO Berthing (15) A,C 2
2-148-0-L* Crews Berthing (18) A,C F 26
2-148-1-L* Crews Berthing (9) A,C 26
2-153-1-L* Crews Head A S,W 5
2-154-4-L* CPO Head A S,W
2-154-2-L* Passageway C 11
2-157-2-L* Crews Berthing (18) A,C 26
2-157-1-L* Crews Berthing (18) A,C 26
2-169-4-L* Crews Head A S,W 5
2-169-2-L* Passageway A,C 11
2-169-1-L* Passageway A,C 11
2-169-3-Q* Fan Room A,C F 13
2-170-0-L* Crews Berthing (30) A,C F 26
2-171-1-L* Crews Head A S,K 5
2-175-2-L* Crews Head A S,W 5
2-175-1-L* Crews Head A S,W 5
2-178-2-L* Crews Berthing (15) A,C 26
2-178-1-L* Crews Berthing (15) A,C 26
2-180-0-L* Crews Lounge A,C F 11
2-183- 2-L* Passageway C 11
2-183-0-Q* Lchr Machy Rm A,B,C F 2
2-183-1-L* Passageway C 11
2-184-2-Q* Fan Room A,C W 13
2-184-1-Q* Fan Room A,C W 13
2-187-2-L* Crews Berthing (15) A r C 262-187-0-E* Emergency Gen Rm. #2 A,3,C F # S,P 31
2-187-1-L* Crews Berthing (15) A,C 26
2-196-6- A* Athletic Gear Strm [210] A 32
2-196-2-L* Passageway C F 11
2-196-2-A* Laundry Issue Rm [400] A,C 372-196-0-Q* Laundry A,C S,W 37
2-198-2- A* Crews Baggage Rm [265] A 32
2-200-2- A* Trunk Strm [255] A 32
2-202-2- A* MAA Strm [350] A 32
2-204-2-L* Passageway C 11
2-205-6-A* Electrical Strm A 32
2-205-4-C* Msl Safety Observer Rm A
2-205-2-L* Passageway C 11
2-205-0-E* Steering Gear Rm A,B,C 14
2-205-1-A* Boatswains Strm [950] A 14
SECOND PLATFORM 58 Compartments
3-B-O-V Void
3-4-0-A* Boatswains Strm [460]
3-12-0-A* SD Strm [1700]
3-19-2-A* Canvas Shop S^Strm [700]
3-19-1-L* Passageway
3-19-3-A* Wardroom Strm [140]
3-21-1-A* Sgdn Cdr Strm i 160]
3-23-0-L* Crews Berthing (39)3-35-0-Q* Fan Room
























































































































3-38- 2-C* Sonar Control Rm
3-38-G-L* Crews Berthing (39)3-53- 2-A* Upper Chill Strm f 1280]
3-53-0-A* Lower Chill Strm [325]
3-53-1-A* Freeze Strm [680]
3-53-3-A* Dry Provisions Strm [600]
3-56-0-L* Vestibule
3-56-1-L* Passageway
3-59-2-Q* IC Motor Gen Rm #1
3-59-0-C* Fwd IC Gun Plot Rm
3-59- 1-L* Crews Berthing (7)3-66-2-Q* Fan Room
3-72-2-L* Passageway
3-75-2-E* Enclosed operating Sta
3-97-4-L* Passageway
3-97-2-E* Enclosed Operating Sta
3-98-1-F Lube Oil Settling Tank
3-99-1-F Lube Oil Settling Tank
3-101-1-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-102-1-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-103-1-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-104-2-Q* AC Machy Rm #2
3-104-0-Q* Supply Support Center
3-104-1-A* SD Strm [2000]
3-108-0-L* Passageway
3-119-1-E* Enclosed Operating Sta
3-123-1-L* Passageway
3-126-1-A* Engineer Strm [420]
3-141-1-E* Enclosed Operating Sta
3-141-3-L* Passageway
3-142-2-F Lube Oil Settling Tank
3-143- 2-F Lube Oil Settling Tank
3-145-2-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-146-2-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-147-2-F Lube Oil Storage Tank
3-148- 2-E* Shaft Alley #2
3-148-2-Q* 400Hz MG Rm #2
3-148-1-T* Trunk
3-148-3-M* Small Arms Magazine
3-151-1-M* 40MM Saluting Pwr Mag
3-157-0-M* Missile Magazine
3-17Q-0-C* Aft IC Msl Plot Rm
3-178-4-A* SD Strm
3-178-2-T* Trunk
3-178-1-A* SD Strm [1018]
3-183-0-A* IC Equip Strm
3-183-1-A* SD Strm (Elect) [300'J3-187-0-E* Pump Rm #2
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COMPT. NO.* COMPARTMENT NAME*
FIRE3 FLOODING HAZARD
HAZARD HAZARD* RANK 5
























Medical Strm #2 [190
]
5"/54 Cal Handling Rm
















































Flam Lig Strm [135]
SD Strm (Electy [1200 ]
Pump Room




































































































Aux JP-5 Stowage Tank
Flam Liq Strm [275]
Ordnance strm [4100]










































COMPT. NO. » COMPARTMENT NAMES HAZARD HAZARD* RANKS
6-62- 1-F Fuel Oil Service Tank B P 13
6-67-2-F Contaminated Oil Tank B P
6-68-4-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-68-2-W Fresh Water Tank P,W 7
6-68-1-Q Underwater Log Trunk P 14
6-68-3-W Fresh Water Tank W,P 7
6-68-5-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-76-4'W Bilge Sump Tank B P 12
6-76-2-W Reserve Feed Water Tank P
6-76-1-W Reserve Feed Water Tank P
6-78-0-V Cofferdam P
6-80- 1-W Emerg Feed Water Tank P
6-88-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-94-2-W Bilge Sump Tank B P 12
6-98-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-104-4-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-104-2-F Fuel Oil Service Tank B P 13
6-104-1-F Fuel Oil Service Tank B P 13
6-104-3-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-112-2-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-112-0-V Cofferdam P
6-112-1-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-114-2-W Fresh Water Tank P,W 7
6-114-1-W Fresh Water Tank P,W 7
6-120-1-W Bilge Sump Tank 3 P 12
6-123- 2-W Reserve Feed Water Tank P
6-123-0-V Cofferdam & Solid Ball P
6-123-1-W Reserve Feed Water Tank P
6-124-2-W Emerg Feed Water Tank P
6-132-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-138-1-W Bilae Sump Tank B P 12
6-142-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-148-2-V Void P 4
6-148-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-148-1-E* Shaft Alley #1 P 25
6-148-3-F Contaminated Oil Tank B P
6-157-2-A* Special Cloth Strm [2100] A P 32
6-157-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13




6-163-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 13
6-163-1-V Void P 4
6- 166-2- A* Drying Rm A P
6-169-4-A* Ships Store Strm £320] A,B P 32
6-169-2-V Void P 4
6-169-0-F Fuel Oil or Ball Tank B P 136-169-1-Q* Aft IC Motor Gen Rm A r C P 11
6-170-2-V Void P 4
6-172-4-A* Chem War Def Strm [660] A P 10
6-172-2-T* Trunk 14
6-177-0-T* Trunk P 14
6-178-2-A* SB Strm [450] A P 37
6-178-0-T* Trunk P 14
6-178-0-
J
Aux JP-5 Stowage Tank B P 10
6-178-1-A* SD Strm (Rep Pts) M280] A P 37




CO MPT. NO.i COMPARTMENT NAME 2
FIRE 3 FLOODING HAZARD



























Spare Parts Strm [680]
Dry Provision Strm [400]























F - Oil Stow
J - JP-5 Sto
K - Chemical




V - Void Com

































of Centerline to Port
of Centerline to Starboar





1 - Main Deck»01,02,03,. 0pward«2, 3,4 r . . . Downward
2 Figure in parenthesis {) is number of berths within space.
Figure in brackets [ ] is cubic feet of storage space.
3 Fire Hazard by Class
A - Ordinary Combustible Materials. (Woodwork, paper,
bedding, clothes, rags, canvas, rope, etc.)
B - Flammable Liquids. (Gasoline, kerosene, fuel oil,
diesel oil, paint, spirits« flammable stores, etc.)
C - Electrical and Electronic Equipment. (Motors,
controllers, transmitters, receivers, radars, etc.)
H - Ammunition and Explosives.
Flooding Hazard by System
F - Fire Main
S - Sea Water Cooling or Sanitary Flushing System
W - Chill Water Cooling System or Potable (Fresh) Water
System
P - Miscellaneous Piping, Adjacent Liquid Stowage
Tanks, or Connections to Sea.
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